Consideration for a Two-State Solution - Part IV

Menachim Begin 1977-1983

A Holocaust survivor, and a religiously educated Jew, Menachim Begin’s Revisionist approach to Zionism reflected two primary beliefs. First, Judaism had only survived the millennia by embracing its historical teachings. Second, the historical State of Israel included the entirety of Trans-Jordan, modern Palestine, Judea and Samaria, and Gaza. As such, Begin viewed Ben Gurion’s acquiescence to a Partition of the land as both “illegal” and “unjust,” in betrayal of Jewish history, and the product of a European socialist “mainstream Zionist.” Begin’s dilemma then became the justification for Palestinian entitlement to civil rights and liberties without forsaking Israel’s entitlement to its land.

Ben Gurion and Begin were pre-State philosophical and political arch enemies. Ben Gurion’s Haganah, formed in 1920 to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine, practiced strategic “self-restraint” against the British, and focused on countering Palestinian activity. The Irgun, founded in 1931 by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, was an aggressive, insurgent paramilitary organization that endorsed violent attacks against the British, considered to be illegal occupiers. From 1943 thru 1948 the Irgun was led by Menachim Begin, an unidentified “terrorist.” Begin was disguised as a Hasidic rabbi and never identified as such by the British. After the founding of the State, and once identified as leader of the Irgun, the British government denied Begin an entry visa until 1972, five years before he became prime minister.

In June 1948 the ship Altalena was recognized to be smuggling weapons for use by the Irgun into Israel. Ben Gurion ordered the Haganah to fire on the Irgun-chartered ship. Begin, however, instructed his men not to return fire against their “fellow Jews.” Shortly thereafter, the Irgun was forced to disband, affirming the Haganah (to become the IDF) as the official military arm of the State. Years later, referring to the Altalena incident, Begin recounted: “My greatest accomplishment was not retaliating and causing civil war.”

Ben Gurion’s Mapai Party (“Workers Party of the Land of Israel”) was a democratic socialist party, which eschewed identity with religious elements. The Mapai-related coalitions ran the socialist-based government until its defeat in 1977. The original Begin-led Herut (“Freedom”) Party, a combination of revisionist, religious, traditional, and libertarian groups, then took control.

To Begin, Jewish nationalism was obligated to provide equal treatment and entitlement including full rights and civil liberties to Israel’s Arab inhabitants. This conflicted with Israel’s 1948 Martial Law covering the Arab population, which incorporated significant, discriminatory restriction on Arab activity and freedom of movement. The law applied to Arab communities in the Galilee, the Negev, a portion of Ashkelon, and three Arab villages in central Israel, including Jaffa. In 1966, Begin’s Herut party was finally successful in the revocation of the Military’s legal control of the Arab population.

The “6-Day War” in June 1967, required Israel to undertake the responsibility of managing the newly captured Golan, Gaza, Sinai, Judea and Samaria, and East Jerusalem. With an Israeli population of 2.4MM people, the Arab population expanded from 14 percent (400k) to 35 percent (1.3MM) of the total population. On June 14-19, the Israeli cabinet held a series of secret meetings to address the issues of both the captured territories and the increased Arab population. Begin served on a subcommittee and certain conclusions reflected the influence of his Herut party philosophy.

The Sinai (Gaza) and Golan were never considered to be part of historical Israel and could be exchangeable for peace with Syria and Egypt. East Jerusalem would be annexed and its municipal boundaries expanded into Judea and Samaria. The Jordan River would now serve as Israel’s “security border,” but left open was its designation as a “political boundary.”

The future of Judea and Samaria was more problematic. Annexation raised demographic considerations as to Israel evolving into a “bi-national” state. However, the creation of an independent Palestinian state opened major security questions. The concept of Palestinian autonomy was considered, where Arabs would handle internal governance, but Israel retained “ownership” of the territory. While Begin acknowledged the value of enhanced security thru the establishment of Judea and Samaria settlements, primary focus remained retention of these historically Jewish lands. He was philosophically torn between the obligation to provide Palestinians with basic inalienable rights, but unwilling to cede the captured Judea and Samaria territories. Politically, however, he avowed that “might makes right.” Ten years later, in a 1977 speech in Nablus, Begin pledged more settlements in the “liberated” (not occupied) Judea and Samaria territories.

Begin understood Israel’s dependence on the U.S. as a protector and benefactor. He was sensitive to a “peace agenda” President Carter wanted to present wherein the “occupied territories” would be exchanged for Israel’s acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338 (land for peace and recognition of Israel’s right to exist). In a July 1977 meeting with Carter, Begin agreed to acceptance of the proposal, subject to adjusted language referencing withdrawal “from territories” rather than “from ALL territories.”

The September 1978 Camp David Accords included Begin’s agreement to a “framework for Autonomy” for Gaza and the “Arabs of Judaea and Sumaria”, in exchange for NOT nationalizing the territories. Other provisions provided the Arabs’ right to vote in Israel, except for votes on determination of the fate of the territories; the right to purchase land in Israel as well as Israeli right to purchase land in the territories; removal of Israeli military to “remote” areas; and establishment of a mechanism toward self-rule over a 5-year period. Not in the Accords but intended was the right of selection of Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Effectively, Palestinians would be awarded all equal civil rights and entitlements within the State of Israel, even while Judea and Samaria and Gaza territories remained under Israeli purview.

This framework typified Begin’s basic values, as further delineated in the Knesset debate on the future Egyptian Agreement, December 28, 1978. First, both the Israelis and the Arabs would suspend “sovereignty” claims to Judea and Samaria. Secondly, the affirmation that Zionism and Apartheid are incompatible. Thirdly, a country cannot ethically control land without granting right to all its citizens. However, specifically excluded was an acknowledgement of the “National Rights of the Palestinians.”

Begin’s two-week negotiation for the 1978 Camp David Accords, created a precursor to several of the most significant and long-standing events in Israel’s history. It internally affirmed Israel’s dependency on U.S. benevolence and support. It defined concepts and principles leading to the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995, as well as the peace agreement with Jordan in 1994. Most significantly, it affirmed the principle that Judea and Samaria and Gaza were part of Israel’s historical entitlement.

Regardless of his accomplishments, there were consequential lapses in political judgement. During the 1982 incursion into Lebanon to neutralize the PLO, the decision to extend past the Litani River, as far as the suburbs of Beirut, led to a clash with President Reagan and a direct threat to U.S. support for Israel. Worse was the stain from the Phalange Christian massacres of September 16-18 within the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

Begin’s wisdom, insight and vision led to Israel’s first peace agreement with an Arab country. Equally significant is what was not compromised: relinquishment or nationalization of Judea and Samaria and Gaza. He was a principled, meticulous, religious, and educated individual. His background, intellect, and historical perspectives made him one of the most significant prime ministers in Israel’s history.

Menachim Begin’s term was sandwiched in between two terms served by Yitzak Rabin. In Part V, the fourth prime minister, Ariel Sharon, comes on the scene with his own plans for Israel. Sharon was never terribly troubled by U.S. pressure for a “two-state solution.” U.S. demands to cease settlement construction conflicted with his perspective of Israel’s security requirements.