Consideration for a Two-State Solution - Part V

Ariel Sharon — 2001-2006

The 2005 “disengagement” from Gaza was, for Ariel Sharon, the antithesis of both his nature, as well as life’s direction. Born in 1928 on moshav Kfar Malal to obdurate, mistrustful Russian parents, he was instilled with a deep-seated disdain for Arabs, amplified by the 1929 riots. He developed an inordinate sense of self-confidence and a compulsive work ethic, focusing deeply on details and an uncanny knowledge of Israel’s terrains. He was recognized for his analytical military brilliance, having served in every Israeli war from 1948 until his “retirement” in July 1973. To Sharon, Israeli military success required embedding into the Arab psyche a “psychology of defeat.” His notoriously aggressive counter-terrorist activities in both Judea and Samaria and Gaza reflected this objective.

Sharon was an extremely self-confident maverick, disdainful of authority and ambivalent to military politics. He was appointed in 1969 as head of the Southern Command (Negev/Sinai Peninsula). In 1972, Sharon was advised by Chief of Staff David Elazar that he was going to be “retired” as of July 1973. Upon appeal directly to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, Sharon was allowed the command of a reserve unit which afforded him overview of the Egyptian troop buildup on the east side of the Canal. Sharon’s warning of an impending attack, and the inadequacy of the Bar Lev Line’s defensibility, was disregarded by his superiors.

The Bar Lev Line was a defensive system built by Israel on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal after the 1967 war. It consisted of 31 fortified points, each forming a complex, multi-layered fortress stretching from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. It was intended to provide impenetrable protection from direct Egyptian attacks crossing the Suez Canal. On the morning of Oct. 5, 1973, Egyptian forces overwhelmed the fortification in 4.5 hours, with a staggering loss of 126 Israelis and capture of another 161. This event ultimately catapulted Sharon into politics, fixating on blistering indictments of, and disgust with, defense establishment “ineptitude.”

In 1977, as Minister of Agriculture in the Begin government, Sharon established the architecture for an aggressive settlement construction campaign within the territories. He aligned with the Gush Emunim, not out of religious fervor, but to capitalize on political and popular support for Judean and Gaza settlement activity. However, it was the impact of the Russian “Aliyah” in 1990, as P/M Shamir’s Minister of Construction and Housing, that Sharon truly shined. In a 4-year period, 550,000 Jews emigrated from the former Soviet Union. To accommodate the housing challenge, in 1989-90 Sharon built almost 10,000 new single family homes within the 1967 lines, and 15,000 units around Jerusalem and into Judea. Sharon saw this as an opportunity to change “…not just the demography…. but to change the geography” of the country.

Sharon was never terribly troubled by U.S. pressure for a “two-state solution.” U.S. demands to cease settlement construction conflicted with his perspective of Israel’s security requirements. Directives to stop construction would be ignored, embarrassing Israel’s ruling government and offending the U.S. It was not until he became a Prime Minister that Sharon, like his predecessors, came to appreciate Israel’s military and diplomatic dependency on the U.S.

Sharon believed in the Palestinian national identity of the Arab population. He, too, felt that Israel could not internally govern 3.5 million Arabs without loss of its Jewish identity. As early as 1970, he publicly favored a state within Jordanian territories. But a state in Judea and Samaria or Gaza would become a terrorist-controlled political entity and a constant threat to Israel.

Sharon ultimately adopted the Begin position for Judea and Samaria: Israeli retention of the territories for security, but creation of an Arab self-governing process. The1979 peace treaty with Egypt mitigated the security requirements related to Gaza, opening the area to a potential “Land for Peace” exchange. But it was after the Rabin assassination in 1995, followed by the Wye River Memorandum in 1998 that Sharon focused on finding a mechanism for accommodating the “Palestinian needs.”

The failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit led to the second Intifada, and all but eliminated the Peace Movement in Israel. During the 2001 campaign, Sharon was uncompromising in his attacks upon P/M Barak for betraying Israel’s security thru concessions to Arafat at Camp David. Sharon’s calculated political appearances reinforced his strength, experience, orientation to security, but coupled with an unwavering desire to find peace. Subtly, during the campaign, Sharon referred to the “painful concessions” needed for peace. And, he was true to his word.

Immediately after the election, Sharon laid the groundwork for reversal of his historical approach toward Palestinian independence. Clandestinely, he reached out to Arafat with an offer that, in exchange for relief from the Intifada, he would commence talks toward achieving Palestinian statehood. When Arafat blatantly refused, Sharon approached President George W. Bush and offered to “consider a territorial compromise.” Sharon’s goal was to demonstrate both Israel’s respect for stated U.S. policy, and appreciation of its dependency on U.S. military and political support.

Bush acknowledged Israel’s gesture in the June 2002 speech that introduced his “Roadmap for Peace.” Reaffirming the U.S. call for a Palestinian state, Bush was specific that it could not be built “on a foundation of terror and corruption.” And it could not be led by Arafat. Bush’s qualifying conditions satisfied Sharon that the U.S. would not impose unacceptable mandates on Israel’s quest for a Palestinian resolution.

Sharon’s commitment to the creation of a Palestinian State was based on three assumptions: First, the idea had historical backing. The original 1947 UN Partition, the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accord I/II, the Wye River Memorandum, the 2000 Camp David meeting, the Roadmap to Peace, the Geneva Accords of October 2003, the Clinton Parameters and countless other lower-key initiatives all sought to accomplish a two-state structure.

Second, Sharon’s mantra was proactivity, not reactivity. The U.S. was engaged in a war against aggressive radical Islam that resulted from 9/11 and military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel was embroiled in the second Intifada. To the U.S. State Department, the Israel/Palestinian issue was the disseminating cause of these issues. Israel needed to assist the U.S. in finding a resolution. In exchange, the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security would be deeply cast.

Third, Israel was facing multiple pressures: the U.S. State Dept. position; the implementation of the internationally endorsed Geneva Accords; continuing impacts from the second intifada; and an outright rebellion by members of the IDF.

Without U.S. backing, untenable obligations could be thrust on Israel by the international community. Sharon must demonstrate to the Bush administration a legitimate plan for disengagement. But for Sharon to obtain internal political backing for such a plan, he required direct commitments of support from the U.S.

Those commitments were addressed in an April 14, 2004 letter from George W. Bush stating the following: (1) Israel was not obligated to its pre-1967 borders; (2) Palestinians should return to their own state, not Israel; (3) Israel should retain the settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria.

The Bush letter became a primary motivator for approval of Sharon’s plan for Israeli disengagement from the 21 Gaza and four Judean settlements, as approved by Israel’s Cabinet on June 6. The plan was adopted by the Knesset on Oct. 25, 2004, and formally adopted as The Disengagement Plan Implementation Law in February 2005. The disengagement was implemented in August and September 2005.

For better or for worse, Ariel Sharon will always be recognized as the prime minister who abandoned settlements and reallocated specific territories to the indigenous Arab population for use in creation of a Palestinian State.

In Part VI, Israel’s obligation to a two-state solution will be discussed, as well as conclusions and the author’s assessment of opportunities for accomplishment of a Palestinian state.